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Similar to the overall situation in Western Europe,
the Muslim youth of Turkish background in Germa-
n y1 are quite different to the generation of their par-
ents. Far from homogeneity, being a Muslim is nowa-
days made up of differentiation, cultural complexity,
and mobility at an individual level even if communal
features remain relevant. The following aims at brief-
ly reviewing these trends while underlining the op-
portunities provided by the German context. 
Is Islam Soluble
into Germany?
Sunni Muslims 
of Turkish OriginThe first element to keep in mind concern-ing Turkish Islam in Germany is its transna-
tional dimension. Being located Ôin be-
tweenÕ at least two national contexts, name-
ly home- and host-countries, Islamic groups
Ð mainly organized into associations Ð and
individuals develop original and particular
social practices and discourses which deal
with multiple national settings. This rele-
vance of transnationalism is directly linked
to the specific national background of Turk-
ish Muslims. The transplantation of political
religious trends from Turkish to German ter-
ritory from the 1960s onwards mainly
helped to increase the potential of these
groups because Germany offered opportu-
nities Ð stability, freedom, autonomy and in-
dependence Ð which Turkey, a Republic
that, having interpreted l a i c i t  as state con-
trol of religion, did not and still does not
provide. The transnationalization of the so-
cial space produced by Islamic-Turkish ac-
tors in Germany grows also on the basis of a
Ôlong distance nationalismÕ referring to the
extension of the ÔtraditionalÕ audience
among migrants through the media, main-
taining the presence of some political per-
sonalities and debates in the daily life of
Turks living in Germany.2 The situation of
Turkish migrants in Germany composes
then a permanent interplay of social posi-
tions neither systematically, nor clearly at-
tached to stable forms of social capital in
both countries. 
Muslims of Turkish origin in Germany can
also benefit from their particular location in
a country of which they are not systemati-
cally citizens. Associations can be viewed as
providing alternative modes of action to
that which is provided by the exclusive ref-
erence to the welfare state as a form of in-
corporation that is deeply embedded in ter-
ritorial and national definitions of member-
ship. This emergence of a transnational
space in which Islamic mobilization has
been organized lies at the cross-roads be-
tween the legal management of religion
and the externalization of Islam as a Ôfor-
eignersÕ cultural issueÕ. It is a pure product of
the complex articulation of rights, rules, and
institutions, independent of the usual focus
on debates about political participation and
jus sanguinis. 
The German political management of Is-
lam is mainly diplomatic. In relation to the
political agenda, Islam is treated as a For-
eign Affairs issue, and more recently as a Ôse-
curity linkedÕ problematic. From its symbolic
to material aspects, many indicators justify
the assessment of Islam as not being a so-
cial-cultural policy matter. As the very sym-
bol of the Kemalist definition of l a  c i t , the
management of several aspects of religious
life by the Diyanet Isleri Trk-Islam Birligi
(DITIB, Office of Religious Affairs) introduces
the Turkish state as one of the actors of the
Islamic scene reconstructed in Germany. At
the same time, the German authoritiesÕ des-
ignation of the DITIB as the Ômost favoured
lordÕ among the plausible partners stimu-
lates competition between associations
such as the Islamische Gesellschaft Milli G-
rs (IGMG, Islamic Society National Vision)
or the Verband der Islamischen Kulturzen-
tren (VIKZ, Union of Cultural Islamic Centres)
in the field of education, the opening of
mosques or the ÔimportationÕ of imams from
Turkey to Germany. Several means have
been organized between Turkey and Ger-
many to avoid a DITIB monopoly on these
affairs. In the 1990s, for example, the VIKZ
opened a centre for the education of h o c a s
in Cologne, giving them the possibility to
recruit persons with experience in living in
Germany and German-language capacity to
teach in their mosques. Significantly, those
rivalries and competition between the main
actors are not submitted to direct interven-
tion and repression of the Turkish state. 
Indeed, one of the first opportunities for
Islamic Turkish associations in Germany
arose from the distance from the Turkish
state, in spite of its maintained sovereignty
in Germany, especially through taxation and
conscription. Escaping from Turkey without
really leaving it, Turkish Islam in Germany
cannot be dissociated from this permanent
and complex interaction of the two national
settings referring to different sets of oppor-
tunities. 
The opportunities
The first elementary opportunities used
by transplanted Turkish networks are legal Ð
open to all non-German citizens who are al-
lowed to organize eingetragene Vereine ( e . V )
associations. Thus, the Islamic associative
network, which initially developed in Ger-
many, corresponded to the juridical restora-
tion of religious tendencies that exist in Tur-
key yet had found in Germany the possibili-
ty to act freely. This appears to be the first
step of the installation of Islamic associative
networks in Germany.
A second stable set of opportunities is
provided by the rules concerning the posi-
tion of religion in the public sphere. The
German tradition separates religion and
state without considering religion as a non-
legitimate actor in the public sphere, such
as is the case within the constitutional inter-
pretation of l a  c i t  in France or Turkey. One
elementary resource the associations can
thus mobilize stems from the status of cor-
poration of public law (Krperschaft des f-
fentlichen Rechts), given to religious com-
munities (Religionsgemeinschaft) which
rule and administer their business in an au-
tonomous way: raising taxes (K i r c h e n s t e u e r) ,
deciding the composition of religious in-
struction, opening religious places, and be-
ing represented in public institutions such
as hospitals, the army, prisons, and the me-
dia. Islamic Turkish associations could gain
immediate benefits from this recognition in
terms of authority, legitimacy and inde-
pendence in their functioning. It could be
argued that the dynamism of the associa-
tive network among Muslims in Germany is
a result of institutionalization in the quest
for recognition. De facto, the claim for offi-
cial recognition began in 1997 with an offi-
cial demand made by the Turkish VIKZ Ð a
demand rapidly followed by other requests.
This is a real difference compared to other
countries where the claim for institutionali-
zation appears to be a late indicator of Ôvisi-
bilityÕ. 
The third set of opportunities derives from
the fact that given that the majority of Mus-
lims living in Germany are not German citi-
zens, the issue of Islam is not compelling for
national politicians as an electoral argu-
ment. The lack of incentive is exacerbated
by the collectively shared illusion of Germa-
ny as not being a country of immigration.
The lexical stigmatization of foreigners is
another part of a political intention to keep
foreignersÕ issues (among them Islam) out of
the domestic public sphere. But at the same
time, being kept outside of domestic issues
and even ignored by politicians and aca-
demics gave the opportunity to Islamic as-
sociations to organize their own social sites
dealing with a double-sided Ôchanging face
of religionÕ3: on the one hand is a need for
new types of communal activities, and on
the other, the transformation of tie binding
the individual to his community of belong-
i n g s .
A secular change?
This Ôchanging faceÕ appears to be a cen-
tral issue for the Islamic Turkish associations
as well as for their audience. The urban
landmarks they provide, and the identity
references and discourses they mobilize,
have been adapted to the change of clien-
tele Ð passing from parents to children or
grandchildren. Islam remains firstly defined
as an origin and a praxis (respect of the five
pillars), but being born Muslim is not a guar-
antee of orthopraxy. For instance, the rela-
tionship to religious belonging and praxis is
not directly inherited from the family but is
transformed and reinvented by younger
generations, while the associative network
maintains the collective reference such as
the moral code and educational needs. The
multiplication of the contacts and modes of
participation in the host society gives new
opportunities to young generations of Mus-
lims who no longer need to stay exclusively
in an assigned group or community. The
b r i c o l a g e of reference appears to be the key
concept underpinning these new forms of
dealing with religious belonging: people
produce their own ways of being a Muslim. 
At an individual level, this change gives
relevance to the category of ÔpersonhoodÕ
which mixes choice, faith and duty, without
feeling under ÔsocialÕ pressure in European
societies. Different socialization dynamics
meet and interact, the associative, familial
or religious aspect being one part of it. It al-
so represents an ethic for life which medi-
ates familial relations, respect for the h a l a l
milieu, while also opening new spaces and
guaranteeing the freedom of others. In this
sense, ÔpersonhoodÕ represents a re-inter-
pretation of tradition based on experience.
It is about becoming a Muslim, not about
Ôre-IslamizationÕ. It is rather an ÔIslamizationÕ
based on real knowledge of heritage, ethics
and codes. The headscarf, for example, is in-
creasingly becoming a non-cohesive argu-
ment between mother and daughter Ð an
argument of technical interpretations
against traditional ones. The daughter
teaches her mother how to wear it. 
The main demands remain, however, the
same: easier access to German nationality,
the right to double-citizenship, and acquir-
ing for Islam a status equal to that of other
religions. 
So the public and communal dimension of
Islam in Germany still asks for recognition
and visibility in the urban milieu. But a
strong differentiation is growing between
ÔbelongingÕ and ÔbelievingÕ. While the dis-
tance from the Ôlegitimate authoritiesÕ is
growing, the religious practices are a matter
of personal and individual choice and pri-
vate conscience. This process is similar to
that of transnationalism: multiplication of
the identity references, mobility, invisibility,
and avoiding state control and authority.
This idea of multiple identities and complex-
ity induces the idea of culture playing as a
reference on both individual and collective
levels, providing codes, symbols, repertoires
and symbolic places in which people occa-
sionally live. It also provides an ideological
apparatus, practices and a symbolic reper-
toire by which the individual/collective con-
sciousness as part of a believerÕs life is built,
educated and controlled. In a kind of Ôsecu-
larÕ perspective, the identification as Muslim
is no more the exclusive producer of referen-
ces and meanings. It rather figures one of
the possible options, but certainly not the
dissolution of religious affiliation. '
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